Robert E. Conger, vs. Tel Tech, Inc.: Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Robert E. Conger, vs. Tel Tech, Inc.: Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Raymond M. Berry; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; attorneys for respondent.
Colin P. King; Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Robert E. Conger, vs. Tel Tech, Inc., No. 890231 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1796







to-t**M EuJJTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT E. CONGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
TEL TECH, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 890231-CA 
Priority Classification 14b 
APPEAL 
from judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Colin P. King 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & 
BENDINGER 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Raymond M. Berry 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ten Exchange Place, 11th floor 
P.O. BOX 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
SEP 11989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT E. CONGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
TEL TECH, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 890231-CA 
Priority Classification 14b 
APPEAL 
from judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Colin P. King 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & 
BENDINGER 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Raymond M. Berry 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Ten Exchange Place, 11th floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1. Robert E. Conger 
2. Tel Tech, Inc. 
3. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.* 
4. Western General Dairy, Inc.* 
5. Scott Wetzel Company* 
*Based upon Appellant Robert E. Conger's representation, 
Appellant has resolved his disputes with all parties to the lower 
court proceedings, with the exception of Tel Tech, Inc. 
Therefore, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., Western General Dairy, 
Inc., and Scott Wetzel Company are not parties to this Appeal. 
See Appellant's Brief, p. i; see also R. 620-621A. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES lv 
OTHER CITATIONS Xi 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature Of The Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 2 
C. statement of Facts 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 16 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED . . . 18 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT TEL TECH DID NOT SUPPLY A 
DEFECTIVE AND UNREASONABLY 
DANGEROUS PRODUCT WHICH HAD CAUSED 
INJURY, AND THAT ONE WHO PROVIDES 
CUSTOMIZED INSTALLATION SERVICES OF 
A NON-DEFECTIVE PRODUCT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO A CLAIM OF STRICT 
LIABILITY 18 
A. The Undisputed And Admitted Facts Show 
That The Gravamen Of Plaintiff's Claim Goes 
To A Service And Not A Product 18 
B. The Theory of Strict Liability Does Not 
Extend To A Service Contract or the Provision 
of Services 28 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S JURY ADMONITION TO 
DISREGARD ONLY TESTIMONY GOING SOLELY TO THE 
STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM CORRECTLY INFORMED THE 
JURY OF THE DIFFERENCE IN LEGAL CONCEPTS IN 
AVOIDING CONFUSION AND PREJUDICE 37 
ii 
III. IF THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR ANOTHER TRIAL ON 
NEGLIGENCE, TEL TECH IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT MR. 
CONGER'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 40 
CONCLUSION 42 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 43 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Allen v. Heil Co., 
285 Or. 109, 589 P.2d 1120 (1979) 28 
Allied Properties v. John A. Bloom and 
Associates, Engineers, 
25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972) . . . 32, 35 
Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 
48 Wash. App 432, 739 P.2d 1177 (1987) 27 
Arthur v. Avon Inflatables, Ltd., 
156 Cal. App. 3d 401, 203 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1984) 27 
Atkins v. Blaw Knox Foundry and Mill Mach., Inc., 
483 F. Supp. 120 1 (W.D. Pa. 1980) 27 
Barbee v. Rogers, 
425 S.W. 2d 342 (Tex. 1968) 30 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 
20 Cal 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) 28 
Barry v. Stevens Equip. Co., 
176 Ga. App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985) 29 
Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 
714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983) 27 
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp. 
60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) 28 
Bigler v. Mapleton Irr. Canal Co., 
669 P.2d 434 (Utah 1983) 39 
Biswell v. Duncan, 
742 P. 2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) 39 
Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 
117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977) 30 
iv 
Brannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 
69 111. App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978) 28 
Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 
176 Mont. 98# 576 P.2d 711 (1978) 28 
Brown v. Superior Court (Abbot Laboratories), 
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 970 (1988) 38 
Brown v. United States, 
411 U.S. 223 (1973) 40 
Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 
of St. Charles Parish, 
366 So.2d 1381 (La. 1978) 31 
Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 
4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971) 28 
Carter v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 
716 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1983) 27 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 
593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) 27 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Boyett, 
674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App. 1984) 27 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 
599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 1980) 27 
Costaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 
376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977) 29 
Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & Heating, 
17 Utah 2d 138, 405 P.2d 611 (1965) 19 
Cropper v. Rego Distribution Center, Inc., 
542 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1982) 26 
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 
575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978) 20 
Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co, 
102 Wash. 2d 68, 684 P.2d 692 (1984) 38 
r
 • / 
Davis v. Pacific Diesel Power, Co. 
41 Or. App. 597, 598 P.2d 1228 (1979) 21 
v 
DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433, (Utah 1983) 3, 14, 19 
Debry & Hilton Travel Services, Inc. v. 
Capitol Intern. Airways, Inc., 
583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978) 39 
Eldridge v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
24 Ohio App. 3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293 (1985) 27 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., v. Armco Steel Co., 
601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979) 30 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) 34 
Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972) 39 
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 
502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) 28 
Gagne v. Bertran, 
43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) 32, 36 
Gann v. International Harvester Co., 
712 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1986) 27 
General Elec. Co. v. Schmal, 
623 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App. 1981) 27 
Gray v. Scott, 
565 P. 2d 76 (Utah 1977) 20 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc•, 
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). . 34 
Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 
67 111. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966) 28 
Hall v. State, 
106 Misc. 2d 860, 435 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1981) 29 
Harris v. Northwest National Gas Co., 
284 Or. 571, 588 P.2d 18 (1978) 28 
Held v. 7-Eleven Food store, 
108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1981) 32, 34 
vi 
Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 
97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975) 33 
Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
270 Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) 22-24, 25 
Hornbeck v. Western states Fire Apparatus, Inc., 
280 Or. 647, 572 P.2d 620 (1977) 28 
Huang v. Garner, 
157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) . . . . 29 
Industrial Risk Insurers v. Creole 
Production Services, 
746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1984) 29 
Jarrell v. Fort Worth steel & Mfg. Co., 
666 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App. 1984) 27 
Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 
700 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1984) 27 
Kaplan v. C Lazy u Ranch, 
615 F. Supp. 234 (D. Colo. 1985) 29 
K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group of Conn., 
489 F. Supp. 813 (D. Conn. 1980) 34 
Kodiak Electric Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 
694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984) 29 
Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 
534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 29 
Kotteakos v. United States, 
328 U.S. 750 (1946) 40 
La Rasa v. Scientific Design Co., 
402 F.2d 937 (3rd cir. 1968) 33 
Lanclos v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 
470 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1985) 27 
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) 28 
vii 
Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 
426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977) 24, 25, 31 
Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 
93 111. App. 3d 244, 417 N.E.2d 154 (1981) 27 
Lugue v. McLain, 
8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) 28 
Magrine v. Krasnica, 
94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) 30 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) 20 
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548 (1984) 40 
Nastasi v. Hochman, 
58 A.D. 2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1977) 25 
Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 
784 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986) 27 
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 
54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) 24-25 
Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 
66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983) 27 
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior 
Burner Service Co., 
427 P.2d 833 (Alaska 1967) 30 
Phillips v. Kimwood Machinery Co., 
269 Or. 485, 525 P.d 1033 (1974) 28 
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 
2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) . 28 
Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. 
468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1984) 14 
Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 
458 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 1972) 25, 30 
Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc., 
124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984) 29 
viii 
Siebern v. Missouri-Illinois Tractor & Equip. Co., 
711 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. App. 1986) 27 
Smith v. Home Light and Power Co., 
734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987) 38 
Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 
668 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1981) 29 
Stodghill v. Frat-Allis Constr. Mach., Inc., 
163 Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183 (1982) 14 
Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co., 
34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973) . . . . 35 
Stuckey v. Young Expl. Co., 
586 P.2d 726 (Okl. 1978) 29 
Swenson Trucking & Excavating Inc., v. 
Truckweld Equip. Co., 
604 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1980) 25 
Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 
196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) 28 
Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 
10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969) 30 
Walla v. United states, 
432 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Wis. 1977) 29 
Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 
361 Pa. Super. 137, 522 A.2d 52 (1987) 26 
Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 19 
Winans v. Rockwell International Corp., 
705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) 29 
Worrell v. Barnes, 
87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) 28 
Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1983) 31 
ix 
Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Const., art. VIII, S 3 1 
Utah Const., art. VIII, S 8 1 
Court Rules 
Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 3 1 
Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 4 1 
Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 4A 1 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Rule 4A 1 
Other Authority 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 323 (1965) 14, 18 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 402A (1965). . . . 21, 29, 30, 31 
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 . . 32 
x 
OTHER CITATIONS 
Prior Brief of Appellant 13, 18 
Prior Reply Brief of Appellant 14, 15, 31 
xi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 890231-CA 
ROBERT E. CONGER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
TEL TECH, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Rules 3, 4 
and 4A of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Rule 4A of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. Mr. Conger appeals from the Third 
Judicial District Court's Entry of Judgment in favor of Tel Tech, 
Inc., on February 8, 1989, on a jury verdict. (See R. 884-886, 
895-896, 910-911.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that Tel Tech did 
not supply a defective and unreasonably dangerous product which 
had caused injury, and that one who provides installation 
services of a non-defective product is not subject to a claim of 
strict liability, but is subject only to a negligence claim? 
2. Was the trial court's jury admonition to disregard only 
testimony relating to unreasonably dangerous product sufficient 
to avoid prejudice to plaintiff's negligence claim? 
3. If the case is remanded for another trial on 
negligence, may defendant now assert plaintiff's comparative 
negligence as an affirmative defense? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
On January 1, 1981, Appellant Robert E. Conger fell from the 
top of a stainless steel milk tanker on which he was walking. On 
September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger filed an action seeking damages 
for personal injuries sustained in the fall against Tel Tech, 
Inc., and others. The action against Tel Tech alleged that Tel 
Tech was negligent in its modification of the tanker, which 
included installation of cleaning equipment inside the tanker, 
because Tel Tech had failed to install walk protection on the top 
of the tanker and to warn of the necessity of such walk 
protection. Near the end of trial, Mr. Conger amended his 
Complaint also to allege a theory of strict products liability. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On April 18, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Second Amended 
Complaint. On July 23, 1984, Tel Tech filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that Tel Tech owed no duty to warn Meadow 
Gold, that any duty was discharged by Meadow Gold's knowledge of 
the hazard, and that Tel Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any duty to 
judge the adequacy of Meadow Gold's direction with respect to the 
installation of cleaning equipment. (R. 185-86, 189-200.) On 
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September 20, 1984, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision 
granting Tel Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 349-353.) 
On November 6, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Motion to Amend and/or 
for Relief From Judgment Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which the trial court denied. (R. 371-372, 385-386.) 
Mr. Conger voluntarily dismissed his claims against Western 
General Dairy, Inc., and settled with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. 
and Scott Wetzel Company. (Appellant's Brief, p. i.) The trial 
court ordered those claims dismissed on January 12, 1987, and Mr. 
Conger filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 1987, with respect 
to the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment for Tel Tech. (R. 
622-626.) After the matter was briefed and argued, on May 13, 
1988, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision in which it stated: 
[Contractual relationships for the performance of services 
impose on each of the contracting parties a general duty of 
due care toward the other, apart from the specific 
obligations expressed in the contract itself. The care to 
be exercised in any particular case depends upon the 
circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable 
danger involved and must be determined as a question of 
fact. 
(R. 647-649 (quoting DCR Inc., v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 
435 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis supplied).) Stating that under its 
contract with Meadow Gold for the performance of services Tel 
Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty of reasonable care, this Court 
reversed the trial court and remanded the case for trial. The 
question for the jury was whether reasonable care required Tel 
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Tech to do more than it agreed to do and had been asked to do 
under its service contract. (R. 647-649.) 
The case was tried to a jury beginning January 23, 1989, and 
concluding January 26, 1989. (R. 922-927.) On January 25, 1989, 
the third day of trial, plaintiff's milk tanker expert, Mr. 
Eilers, testified. Mr. Conger's attorney propounded questions to 
Mr. Eilers which sought to establish elements of a strict 
liability theory. Tel Tech strenuously objected to the 
questioning on grounds of surprise and that throughout the 
lawsuit, the plaintiff had pleaded only negligence. The trial 
court overruled the objection, and allowed the plaintiff to amend 
the Complaint and elicit responses from his expert in an effort 
to satisfy the elements of a strict liability theory. (R. 922, 
pp. 28-38.) 
At the close of evidence, the trial court entertained Tel 
Tech's Motion for Directed Verdict on plaintiff's claim of strict 
liability. The Motion was based on the following undisputed 
facts: Tel Tech offered the specialized service of heliarc 
welding necessary for the installation of stainless steel 
components and parts; Meadow Gold, in need of such service, hired 
Tel Tech to supply parts and labor for the customized 
installation of two spray ball cleaners in the skin of Meadow 
Gold's tanker trailer; the spray balls themselves worked 
perfectly and normally and did not cause injury; as part of the 
4 
service contract, Tel Tech was not asked to install and had not 
installed walk protection; regardless of how plaintiff attempted 
now to couch the claim, the overwhelming, undisputed evidence was 
that the manner of the service performed, rather than any 
"product," was the alleged cause of plaintiff's injuries, see 
Footnotes 2 and 3, infra; the overwhelming case law precluded the 
application of a theory of strict liability where (1) the parts 
that were supplied with the installation service were not 
themselves defective, and (2) the plaintiff's injury allegedly 
arose out of a legal deficiency in the service itself. (R. 927, 
pp. 3-28.) 
After hearing argument on the Motion and reviewing the cited 
authorities, the trial court ruled that the evidence was 
undisputed, that the spray balls themselves were not defective 
and had not caused injury, but rather the gravamen of the claim 
was with Tel Tech's installation service. Where Tel Tech had not 
supplied a defective product that had caused injury, but had 
allegedly performed an installation contract in a negligent 
manner, the court would allow submission of the case to the jury 
based on negligence, but not on strict liability. (R. 927, pp. 
16-28.) 
The trial court then informed the jury that the case would 
be submitted to them for decision on negligence, a fault theory, 
and that they should disregard only that part of Mr. Eilers1 
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testimony that focused solely on the product liability theory. 
(R. 926, p. 11-12.) 
The case was submitted to the jury on Mr. Conger's 
negligence claim, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of 
action. (R. 890-892.) The trial court entered judgment on the 
jury verdict on February 8, 1989. (R. 884-886, 895-896, 910-911.) 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On January 1, 1981, while employed by Beatrice Foods 
Company, Meadow Gold Division ("Meadow Gold11), appellant Robert 
E. Conger ("Mr. Conger") was attempting to clean the interior 
compartments of a stainless steel milk tank trailer. The trailer 
had in the top two interior cleaning devices, known as spray 
balls. (R. 925, pp. 168-169, 173-174, 178-181.) 
2. A spray ball consists of a piece of stainless steel 
tubing inserted through the skin and shell, into the tanker 
itself and welded into place. It is sealed off by a hex nut 
ferrule when not in use. The station is used as a port through 
which a chemical solution and rinsing water are pumped into the 
tank in connection with the cleaning of the tanker's inside. It 
derives its name from the actual device through which the 
solution and water flow. A small spray ball is attached to a 
tube, which is connected to the hose accessing the chemical 
solution and water. As the liquids are pumped through the ball, 
it sprays them systematically throughout the entire inside of the 
6 
tanker compartment. (R. 633, pp. 9, 24; 924, pp. 55-57; 925, p. 
130.) 
3. The top of the tanker trailer also had two hatches that 
accessed the respective compartments, the openings of which 
extended above the top of the trailer surface. (R. 925, pp. 157-
158, 160.) 
4. While walking along the top of the tanker trailer and 
holding onto the end of a hose to hook up to the rear spray ball, 
Mr. Conger stepped over the rear hatch, placed his foot into 
spilled grease or milk fat he had failed to clean, slipped and 
fell off the top of the trailer, and sustained serious personal 
injuries. (R. 925, pp. 114-116, 177-181, 201, 205-206, 233.) 
5. Meadow Gold, Mr. Conger's employer, had purchased the 
milk tanker in March of 1979; two months later, in May of 1979, 
Meadow Gold entered an oral contract with Tel Tech to provide 
parts and labor for the customized installation of the two spray 
balls into the tanker trailer. (R. 924, pp. 19, 21, 22, 33-35, 
38.) 
6. Tel Tech was in the business of selling chemicals, 
stainless steel parts and certain specialized services to the 
dairy industry. Tel Tech provided the specialized service of 
heliarc welding necessary for the technical and sanitary 
requirements for stainless steel welding in dairy equipment. 
Stainless steel welding differs significantly from other types of 
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welding, especially with thin gauges of stainless steel such as 
those involved in the installation of spray ball cleaning devices 
in the skin of a milk tanker. (R. 924, pp. 24, 27-29, 49, 55-57, 
60-62; 925, p. 133; 922, pp. 70, 88-91, 113-114.) 
7. Tel Tech had been hired on numerous prior occasions to 
perform stainless steel installation or welding services at 
Meadow Gold's plants, and Meadow Gold frequently supplied the 
fittings and tubing it wanted installed. (R. 924, pp. 24, 29; 
922, pp. 99-101, 113-114, 120.) 
8. The milk tanker at issue required two spray balls, one 
for each tanker compartment; without them, the interior of the 
trailer could only be cleaned manually by a Meadow Gold employee 
who was required to enter the compartments and brush on chemical 
solution and rinsing water. (R. 925, pp. 155-156, 171.) 
9. After the spray ball stations were welded into the skin 
of the tanker, the operator or other employee responsible for 
cleaning the tanker was only required to remove the hex nut 
ferrule and connect the tube to a hose through which cleaning and 
rinsing solution would be pumped. (R. 925, pp. 168-169, 173-174.) 
10* Donald Dvorak, a local transportation manager for 
Meadow Gold, contacted Tel Tech and reached an oral agreement 
with Tel Tech to provide parts and labor to install two spray 
balls in the top of the tanker trailer. Mr. Dvorak never 
discussed with Tel Tech anything other than the installation of 
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the spray balls. Mr. Dvorak never instructed Tel Tech to install 
walk protection along the top of the tanker trailer in the area 
of the individual spray balls and no facts indicate that Meadow 
Gold wanted walk protection. On May 7, 1979, Tel Tech installed 
the two spray balls and billed Meadow Gold $170.00 plus tax for 
the parts and labor. (R. 924, pp. 22-23, 31, 33-38, 46; 922, pp. 
78-79.) 
11. At the time Tel Tech welded the spray balls into the 
tanker, Meadow Gold had an arrangement with Western General Dairy 
for the use of Western General Dairy's facility to clean its 
tankers. The Western General facility had a portable, swinging 
walkway mounted above the tanker cleaning bay so that it could be 
lowered directly onto the crown near the spray ball stations and 
would not necessitate an employee to walk along the top of the 
trailer to access the spray balls. The two spray balls were 
installed at the Western General facility, and Tel Tech was 
unaware of where the trailer would be cleaned. (R. 925, pp. 54, 
165-168; 924, p. 21; 922, pp. 94-95, 115.) 
12. Tel Tech faithfully performed the service Meadow Gold 
had requested. No evidence exists in the record of Meadow Gold 
ever complaining that Tel Tech's work was deficient or that the 
spray balls did not adequately perform their intended function— 
the cleaning and rinsing of the inside of the tanker. Meadow 
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Gold accepted Tel Tech's services and paid the $178.50 statement 
in full. (R. 922, pp. 92-93.) 
13. Tel Tech's specialty was narrowly focused. Tel Tech 
was not in the business of designing, manufacturing or selling 
milk tankers or safety features on milk tankers. Tel Tech never 
held itself out as having knowledge or experience with respect to 
safety features on milk tankers. Tel Tech was never asked to 
install such safety features and was never consulted or asked to 
consult with respect to such safety features. (R. 633, pp. 20-26; 
636, pp. 11-12, 21-23; 638, pp. 36-37; 924, p. 64; 925, pp. 139, 
142.) 
14. Mr. Conger had driven that particular truck and tanker 
approximately 500 times prior to the accident. He had driven the 
tanker some fifteen to sixteen months after the spray balls were 
installed until his accident. As part of his duties in driving 
the tanker, he was required to clean the compartment interiors 
after he was finished delivering each load. It was also his 
responsibility to clean the exterior of the trailer, as needed. 
(R. 925, pp. 162, 168-169, 154, 171-174, 201; 924, pp. 26, 41-
43.) 
15. To clean the interior compartments, Mr. Conger would 
climb a ladder to the top of the trailer, walk along the top to 
the spray ball stations and connect the hose to the spray balls. 
(R. 925, pp. 168-169, 171-174.) 
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16. Mr. Conger did the cleaning in this manner 300-400 
times before his accident. Prior to the accident, he was clearly 
aware of the danger associated with walking along the top of the 
stainless steel trailer, had spoken with other employees about 
the danger, and had asked his employer to remedy the danger by 
putting up some form of walk protection. His employer did 
nothing.* (R. 925, pp. 172, 176, 217, 219, 228.) 
17. On September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger sued Tel Tech. In 
his Second Amended Complaint, filed April 18, 1984, he alleged 
that Tel Tech "made certain modifications to said tanker, which 
include the installation of clean-out valves on the top of the 
tank," and that Tel Tech "negligently failed to install walk 
protection to the clean-out valves and negligently failed to warn 
and advise of the necessity of such walk protection." (R. 156.) 
18. As set forth above, see B. Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition Below, supra., on appeal from the prior summary 
disposition, the case once before was in this Court on the 
question of whether one who performs a service contract has a 
1
 With the benefit of hindsight, Meadow Gold has stated, had 
Tel Tech installed some form of walk protection, it certainly 
would have paid for it. However, Meadow Gold's statement may be 
disingenuous because Mr. Conger was unable to get Meadow Gold to 
provide some form of walk protection and Meadow Gold's local 
transportation manager, Donald Dvorak, had given some thought to 
putting up walk protection along the top of the trailer but never 
did anything about it. (R. 924, p. 47.) 
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duty to exercise reasonable care beyond the contract 
requirements, and the case was remanded for trial. (R. 647-649.) 
19. At trial, Mr. Conger's milk tanker expert, Mr. Eilers, 
testified extensively regarding his experience in the dairy and 
tanker trailer industry, various types of cleaning equipment for 
dairy trailers, various installations of cleaning equipment, 
various safety equipment and apparatus and his opinion regarding 
standards in the industry for an installer of cleaning equipment. 
He gave his opinion that where access to a cleaning system 
required walking along the top of a tanker trailer, the minimum 
standard of care required the installation of some kind of walk 
protection. He testified that in his opinion, Tel Tech had 
failed to meet the minimum standard of care required of an 
installer of cleaning equipment. (R. 922, pp. 10-27, 40.) 
20. Mr. Eilers also testified on cross examination 
regarding the conduct of Mr. Conger, the he would not have done 
what Mr. Conger did, and that he would have recognized the grease 
Mr. Conger stepped in as a hazard. He testified that the manner 
in which Mr. Conger cleaned the hatches made it more likely to 
create a slippery or hazardous condition on the tanker. He 
testified that safety was everyone's concern, including Mr. 
Conger's. (R. 922, pp. 67-69.) 
21. Mr. Eilers testified that one who provides installation 
services of cleaning equipment in a tanker trailer is not a 
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manufacturer, as did Dr. Thomas Blotter, Tel Tech's engineer. (R. 
922, pp. 18, 156.) 
22. Over Tel Tech's objection, Mr. Eilers then testified 
that in his opinion, Tel Tech had created a hazardous condition, 
and that the "manner" of installation of the spray balls was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous for lack of walk protection. 
(R. 922, pp. 34-38.) 
23. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Tel 
Tech's Motion for Directed Verdict on the strict liability claim, 
on the grounds that the theory of strict liability does not apply 
to a contract for installation services, the product itself was 
not defective and had not caused injury, and plaintiff's claim 
went to the manner of installation rather than any product 
defect.2 (R. 927, pp. 3-28.) 
2
 Not only was the evidence at trial undisputed that the 
spray balls were not, of themselves, defective, that no "product" 
had caused injury, and that plaintiff's allegations went to the 
adequacy of the installation service, but all of plaintiff's 
pretrial allegations and arguments, including arguments to this 
Court, were based solely on the adequacy of Tel Tech's 
performance 3f its service contract with Meadow Gold—the 
customized installation of the spray balls. Up to the time of 
trial, the plaintiff had contended, successfully to this Court, 
that Tel Tech was the provider of a specialized service and had a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its 
service. The following examples of plaintiff's argument are 
taken from Appellant's prior Briefs to this Court: 
Meadow Gold had requested Tel Tech to install the spray 
balls on the tanker because it understood and relied upon 
Tel Tech to have expertise in the installation and servicing 
of dairy equipment and in working with stainless steel 
tankers. 
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(Prior Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied).) 
As pointed out in Appellant's opening brief and again in 
detail in Tel Tech's brief at pp. 6 and 7, Tel Tech and 
Meadow Gold agreed, in other words contracted, for Tel Tech 
to provide a service to Meadow Gold, namely, the 
installation of the spray balls in the tanker. Pursuant to 
the contract, Tel Tech performed the service and received 
consideration therefor. 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied).) 
Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts S 323 (1965), Negligent 
Performance of Undertaking to Render Services, Mr. Conger then 
argued that: 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized and approved the 
generally accepted tort doctrine that "contractual 
relationships for the performance of services impose on each 
of the contracting parties a general duty of due care toward 
the other, apart from the specific obligations of the 
contract itself." 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied) 
(citation omitted).) 
Mr. Conger then argued: 
Thus, based upon the undisputed fact that Tel Tech 
contracted to perform and did perform a service for Meadow 
Gold, Tel Tech owed a general duty to exercise due care to 
Meadow Gold with respect to Tel Tech's agreement to install 
the spray balls. 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (emphasis supplied).) 
A careful reading of DCR[lnc. v. Peak Alarm Co.] compels the 
rejection of Tel Tech's attempted distinctions as well as 
the faulty analysis of the trial court in its Memorandum 
Opinion, since a contractual relationship for the 
performance of services existed between the relevant parties 
in both DCR and this case. 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (emphasis supplied).) 
Moreover, contrary to cases such as Ragsdale [v. K-Mart 
Corp. 468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1984)] and Stodghill [v. 
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24. The trial court then explained to the jury: 
Before I instruct you, I need to apprise you of one 
legal matter that has been taken care of. Originally, the 
plaintiff was making a claim against the defendant on two 
different legal theories; one was a fault theory and one 
was—what's called a product liability theory, which is a 
theory of law upon which people can recover from defective 
products that cause injuries regardless of fault. 
I dismissed the second claim for legal reasons which 
the court doesn't need to concern you with. And you will be 
asked to determine this case based on the negligence or 
fault theory. But some of the evidence that came into trial 
related solely to the—the product theory, evidence that the 
product that was sold was defective and unreasonably safe. 
You'll hear some of the discussions between the lawyers, 
whether that evidence should be admitted, because that legal 
theory is no longer part of the case. That evidence is not 
relevant and will be stricken from the record, and you 
should treat it as if you've never known it. 
(R. 926, p. 11.) 
Frat-Allis Constr. Mach., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 
183 (1982)], Tel Tech's negligent conduct here arose not in 
the context of a distant manufacturer or supplier of a new 
product having no contract with the plaintiff or no 
opportunity to know of the use to which the product would be 
put; Tel Tech's negligence occurred in connection with a 
contract with Meadow Gold to modify a specific tanker to be 
used by Meadow Gold in a particular manner . . . . 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 12 (emphasis supplied).) 
The trial court's ruling is consistent with appellant's prior 
arguments to this Court—that the product itself was not the 
problem, but rather Tel Tech's alleged negligent service pursuant 
to its installation contract with Meadow Gold was the problem 
(see R. 647-649)—and with this Court's Memorandum Decision, 
dated May 13, 1988. (See R. 647-649.) 
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25. The court then instructed the jury on plaintifffs 
negligence claim, defined "negligence" and "ordinary care," and 
explained that: 
Tel Tech[] owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff 
to install the spray balls in a reasonably safe manner, and 
to avoid creating a hazardous or dangerous condition. If 
you find that defendant, Tel Tech, failed to exercise 
reasonable care as a proximate result of which plaintiff was 
injured, you must then determine whether the plaintiff 
failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in a 
manner which proximately caused his injuries. 
(R. 926, pp. 18-20; see also R. 847-883.) 
26. After the jury was instructed, Mr. Conger's attorney 
argued the case relying heavily upon Mr. Eilers1 testimony 
regarding standards in the industry, minimum standard of care, 
and the alleged deficiency of Tel Tech's conduct in its 
installation of the cleaning equipment. (R. 926, pp. 40-41.) 
27. The jury found that Tel Tech had not failed to exercise 
reasonable care. (R. 890-892.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pursuant to a service contract, Tel Tech provided parts and 
labor for the customized service of heliarc welding two spray 
balls into the skin of Meadow Gold's trailer. No parts it 
supplied were defective or caused injury. Plaintiff's claim of 
injury goes to the manner of installation into a preexisting 
product not supplied by Tel Tech, rather than any cognizable 
"product" defect. Alleged deficient installation services, 
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absent a defect in the product installed, are not subject to the 
strict liability doctrine. 
Legal and policy issues which underlie strict liability 
doctrine show the inapplicability of that doctrine to this case. 
Strict liability is not appropriate where one provides customized 
skill and services not subject to the standard quality control 
processes of the factory. One who hires an expert for services, 
under the law, is entitled to only reasonable care and 
competence. The problem of consumer difficulty to trace, 
pinpoint and prove remote fault up the distribution chain to 
distant mass producers of goods does not apply where services 
were not part of a marketing chain and where the transaction 
emanated from a face-to-face relationship. The risk distribution 
justification for strict liability does not apply in the service 
context because of the inherent problems service providers have 
in spreading losses as compared to manufacturers of goods. 
The trial court's jury admonition to disregard testimony 
going only to the strict liability claim accurately and fairly 
stated the law and avoided the confusion, misunderstanding and 
prejudice that otherwise would have occurred. 
If the case is remanded for another trial on grounds of 
prejudice, Tel Tech may assert Mr. Conger's comparative 
negligence as an affirmative defense because any jury confusion 
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would apply equally to Tel Tech's defense and the jury's finding 
of no negligence on Mr. Conger is unreliable. 
ARGUMENT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT TEL TECH DID NOT 
SUPPLY A DEFECTIVE AND UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT 
WHICH HAD CAUSED INJURY, AND THAT ONE WHO PROVIDES 
CUSTOMIZED INSTALLATION SERVICES OF A NON-DEFECTIVE 
PRODUCT IS NOT SUBJECT TO A CLAIM OF STRICT LIABILITY. 
Plaintiff's appeal presents the legal question of the 
conceptual reach of the strict liability theory into the area of 
service contracts or the provision of services. 
A. The Undisputed And Admitted Facts Show That The Gravamen 
Of Plaintiff's Claim Goes To A Service And Not A Product. 
Inconsistent with his original pleading, negligence theory, 
prior arguments to this Court3 and prior ruling of this Court, 
3
 In addition to Mr. Conger's prior arguments to this Court 
set forth in Footnote 2, appellant cited Restatement (Second) of 
Torts S 323 (1965), Negligent Performance of Undertaking to 
Render Services, to show a duty of reasonable care. Section 323 
states: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of the other's person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care 
to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise 
such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm 
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the 
undertaking. 
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Mr. Conger attempts to characterize Tel Tech's offending conduct 
no longer as the negligent provision of services, but now as the 
supply of a defective product—a "cleaning system," incorporated 
into Meadow Gold's tanker trailer. Although alternative pleading 
is a common practice, plaintiff's new-found claim of strict 
liability presents a problem of mutual exclusivity with his prior 
claim and this Court's prior ruling because alleged deficient 
services are not subject to a claim of strict liability. See 
Point I, B., infra. Despite his efforts now to classify the 
terms of the service contract as a product for purposes of 
Section 402A strict liability, plaintiff claims injury due to the 
manner of installation. This Court already has recognized that 
Tel Tech was in the position of a contractor for the provision of 
custom services, as has Mr. Conger, see Footnotes 2 and 3, and 
the trial court properly recognized that it was the customized 
(Emphasis supplied.) Citing DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 
433 (Utah 1983), Williams v. Melby, 6S9 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) and 
Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & Heating, 17 Utah 2d 138, 405 
P.2d 611 (1965), Mr. Conger argued that: 
The general duty between contracting parties is not limited 
only to service contracts which are ongoing until an injury 
occurs, but includes contracts such as here, where work is 
performed, the service has been completed, and the injury 
occurs some time thereafter. 
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-5 (emphasis supplied).) 
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manner of installation—that presented the only factual scenario 
for possible relief.* 
First, the only parts or "product11 Tel Tech supplied were 
the spray balls themselves. The devices worked properly, were 
not defective and did not cause injury.* Tel Tech did not 
manufacture, sell, distribute or supply the tanker trailer with 
its curved, stainless steel skin, the hose or the Meadow Gold 
facility where Mr. Conger ultimately cleaned the tanker. 
Second, because of its specialized skill and expertise of 
heliarc welding, Meadow Gold hired Tel Tech to perform a 
customized service contract which Tel Tech did according to the 
* The standard of review of a directed verdict is the same 
as that imposed upon the trial court: Whether, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, "reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented." Management Committee of Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Assfn v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 
(Utah 1982); Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 
1046-47 (Utah 1978). However, it is the trial court's 
prerogative to determine what law applies to the facts presented. 
The trial court would commit error by instructing on a legal 
theory, such as strict liability, where the facts did not present 
a cognizable claim under that theory. See, e.g., Gray v. Scott, 
565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977). 
5
 Viewing the undisputed evidence in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff, reasonable minds could not differ that 
the product Tel Tech did supply did not satisfy the elements of a 
strict liability claim. It supplied only the spray balls and 
installed them at Meadow Gold's behest. The spray balls worked 
perfectly. It did not provide any other product or component, 
including the tanker trailer, the connecting hose, or the Meadow 
Gold facility where the trailer was cleaned. With respect to the 
product Tel Tech did supply, the strict liability claim failed as 
a matter of law. See Footnote 4. 
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contract's specific terms. Had Tel Tech simply sold the spray 
ball parts to Meadow gold without installing them, they would 
have been useless to Meadow Gold without the specialized skill of 
heliarc welding and their installation into the trailer. 
Third, the safety engineering aspects of the installation 
contract that Tel Tech allegedly overlooked related to the 
location and placement of the spray balls rather than their 
function or operation—clearly, an alleged problem with the 
manner of installation. 
Fourth, plaintiff successfully persuaded this Court that Tel 
Tech had performed a service contract and that one who performs a 
service contract is held to a reasonable person standard, which 
presented a fact question on whether Tel Tech should have 
installed walk protection. See Footnotes 2 and 3 and R. 647-649. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 402A (1965) requires the 
sale of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary user or consumer. Many courts have addressed the 
question of what qualifies as a "product" for Section 402A strict 
liability purposes. In a hybrid sale-service transaction, 
Section 402A liability is limited to defects in the product 
supplied and does not include the non-negligent mistakes in 
service. For example, in Davis v. Pacific Diesel Power, Co. 
41 Or. App. 597, 598 P.2d 1228 (1979), the defendant 
sold rebuilt engines for compressors and, pursuant 
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to a contract with plaintifffs employer, installed the rebuilt 
engines in the compressors. The compressors were used to provide 
oxygen for breathing apparatus. As a result of a fire, 
lubricating oil inside the compressor ignited, releasing carbon 
monoxide into the workers1 supply of breathing air. Plaintiffs 
alleged that the engines were defective and unreasonably 
dangerous because of claimed defects in the automatic shut-down 
system of the compressor. Affirming the trial court's order 
striking plaintiffs1 counts in strict liability, the appellate 
court found that the problem was not with the product defendant 
had sold to plaintiffs1 employer. Rather, the defendant had 
failed to install a functional shut-off system for the 
compressor. The court agreed with the trial court that 
plaintiff's real contention was not with the product supplied, 
but with the method or manner or installation; as a matter of 
law, plaintiff had failed to establish the sale of a defective 
product. Plaintiff's claim was properly submitted to the jury on 
only the negligence claim. 598 P.2d at 1230, 1232-33. 
In the leading case of Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 
Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974), the court held that the negligent 
installation of a non-defective product does not fall within the 
definition of a "dangerously defective product" for strict 
liability purposes. Defendant had mounted a non-defective tire 
on plaintiff's car and allegedly had failed to tighten the lug 
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nuts and to inspect the wheel assembly, causing injury. 
Plaintiff alleged and argued that the "product" defendant had 
sold was not merely the (non-defective) tire, but the inadequate 
installation of the tire on the car, making the car unreasonably 
dangerous for its intended use. Rejecting plaintiff's conceptual 
extension of "dangerously defective product," the court 
recognized the claim for what is was: "Plaintiff contends that 
the defendant should be held strictly liable in tort for the 
negligent installation of the wheel onto the axle." Id. at 77. 
The court refused to accept plaintiff's contention that defendant 
had sold what plaintiff herein might characterize as a "wheel 
system." 
Affirming the trial court's refusal to submit to the jury 
the question of strict liability, the court made several 
pertinent observations: 
"When the contract between plaintiff and defendant is 
commercial in character, the courts are willing to 
extend liability without fault to the hybrid sale-
service transaction, provided that a defective product 
is supplied to the plaintiff or used by the defendant 
in the course of performing the service. . . . " 
In cases other than the sale-service hybrid transaction 
courts have also been reluctant to extend the definition of 
"product" beyond the article actually manufactured or 
supplied. . . . 
In the instant case it is obvious that the product sold to 
plaintiff was not dangerously defective. Even if we 
accepted plaintiff's version of the cause of the accident, 
it was not a dangerously defective tire which caused 
plaintiff's injuries, but rather the installation of the 
wheel on the hub and axle of the auto. In such case it 
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might be said that plaintiff's auto became dangerously 
defective, but certainly not the tire. . . . 
It is clear that this was not a proper case for strict 
liability in tort and the trial court correctly refused to 
submit that issue to the jury. 
Id. at 77-78 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Conger's reliance on another leading case, Newmark v. 
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), is curious 
because of its direct application to defendant's position. In 
Gimbel's, defendant sold a permanent wave solution which burned 
plaintiff's scalp and forehead. Because a beauty parlor had sold 
and applied the solution, the court recognized that the 
transaction involved incidents of a sale and a service. In 
allowing the claim of strict liability to attach to the sale, the 
court recognized that, had the defendant simply sold the solution 
and plaintiff had applied it herself, she still would have been 
burned because of the inherent defects in the wave solution 
itself. 258 A.2d at 700-03. Many courts have commented on the 
meaning and reach of Gimbel's. For example, in Lemley v. J & B 
Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977), the court stated: 
"There the plaintiff had been injured when an allegedly 
defective permanent wave solution was applied to her hair by 
the defendant beauty parlor. The Court, in holding the 
beauty parlor strictly liable for defects in the permanent 
wave solution, was careful to note the sales aspects of what 
it saw as a 'sales-service hybrid transaction.' It will be 
noted that the Court there did not hold that the beauty 
parlor operator would be strictly liable for nonnegligent 
mistakes in its own application of the solution, but only 
for defects in the solution itself." 
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Id. at 1379 (quoting Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, 
Inc., 458 F.2d 1106, 1115 (3rd Cir. 1972) (emphasis supplied)). 
The Hoover court also commented on Gimbel's, as follows: 
[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court held a beauty shop strictly 
liable under an implied warranty of fitness when defective 
permanent wave lotion was applied to a patron's hair. The 
court reasoned that if the lotion had been sold over the 
counter there would have been strict liability. There was 
no logical reason to hold otherwise merely because the 
defective lotion was applied in a service context . . . . 
In [Gimbel's], as in all sale-service hybrid cases, it is 
clear that the product, as opposed to the service, was 
defective. . . . In the case at hand, . . . there was no 
allegation that the tire was defective. 
Hoover, 528 P.2d at 77. 
See also Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 
(W.D. Pa. 19?7) (one who supplies parts and service for brake 
repair is not subject to claim of strict liability; no evidence 
exists to suggest any defects in the components supplied by 
defendant in the repair of the brakes); Swenson Trucking & 
Excavating Inc., v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 1115-17 
(Alaska 1980) (alleged defective weld in ram assembly did not 
subject defendant to claim of strict liability; for strict 
liability to apply, "merchant would . . . have to do something 
more than sell an attachment for the vehicle, agree to put it on, 
and agree to repair the part of the vehicle that eventually 
breaks"); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D. 2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216/ 
217-18 (1977) (where in-flight fire causing airplane crash was 
caused by faulty installation of strobe light system, rather than 
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component parts to the system, manner of installation was the 
cause and strict liability claim did not attach); Cropper v. Rego 
Distribution Center, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1148-49 (D. Del. 
1982) (defendant designed and built facility and incorporated 
components that were not defective of themselves but put in 
system that allegedly created a dangerous situation; professional 
services of designer and builder of riser system facility which 
caused injury and death were not subject to claim of strict 
liability); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 361 
Pa. Super. 137, 522 A.2d 52, 56-57 (1987) (cited by Mr. Conger) 
(non-defective component part supplier does not have a duty to 
anticipate dangers that might be associated with integration of 
its parts into completed product). 
If Tel Tech had sold spray ball parts to Meadow Gold and the 
parts themselves had been inherently defective and caused injury, 
plaintiff's claim of strict liability might have merit under the 
Gimbelf s analysis. However, it was Tel Tech's narrow, 
specialized skill that made the contract valuable to Meadow Gold. 
The parts themselves, installed or uninstalled, were not 
defective and did not cause injury. The manner of installation 
allegedly did. Plaintiff's own expert testified that the 
"manner" of installation was what made the spray balls defective 
and unreasonably dangerous. He also testified that Tel Tech's 
service contract did not qualify Tel Tech as a manufacturer. 
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Regardless of plaintiff's belated attempt *•- -^--true the facts 
into a cognizable strict liirtbii Il j ty case ' - isputed facts and 
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of law preclude that construct:! on , e 
loi',st" of the cases Mr. Congers cites in his Brief are 
vastly distinguishable from this case, usually on several 
grounds. Those cases were not situations where an independent 
contractor, because of its specialized skil 1, was hired to 
perform a customized service of installing a non-defective 
product into a pre-existing product. In those cases, either the 
product itself caused injury, similar to the Gimbel1s analysis, 
and/or the original design of the entire system and all parts 
were included as part of a finished, uncustomized, marketed 
product. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 48 
Wash. App 432, 739 P.2d 1177 (1987) (original design problem of 
entire system); Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574 
(11th Cir. 1986) (original design problem of entire system); 
Siebern v. Missouri-Illinois Tractor & Equip. Co., 711 S.W.2d 935 
(Mo. App. 1986) (original design problem of entire system); Gann 
v. International Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1986) 
(original design problem of entire system); Lanclos v. Rockwell 
Intern. Corp., 470 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1985) (original design 
problem of entire system); Eldridge v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 24 Ohio App. 3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293 (1985) (original design 
problem of entire system); Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 700 P.2d 
830 (Ariz. 1984) (original design problem of entire system); 
Arthur v. Avon Inflatables, Ltd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 401, 203 Ca] 
Rptr. 1 (1984) (original design problem of entire system); 
Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App. 
1984) (original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. v. Boyett, 674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App. 1984) (original 
design problem of entire system); Carter v. Massey Ferguson, 
Inc., 716 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1983) (original design problem of 
entire system); Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 
1983) (original design problem of entire system); Ontai v. Straub 
Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 66 Haw, 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983) 
(product itself caused injury); Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 93 IIII. 
App. 3d 244, 417 N.E.2d 154 (1981) (original design problem of 
entire system); General Elec. Co. v. Schmal, 623 S.W.2d 482 (Tex, 
App. 1981) (original design problem of entire system); Atkins v. 
Blaw Knox Foundry and Mill Mach., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. 
Pa. 1980) (original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 1980) 
(original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar Tractor 
B. The Theory of Strict Liability Does Not Extend To A 
Service Contract or the Provision of Services. 
It is the Court's prerogative to address and determine the 
legal and policy issues which underlie the application and 
claimed extension of the strict liability theory. See, e.g., 
Harris v. Northwest National Gas Co.# 284 Or. 571, 588 P.2d 18 
(1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Machinery Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.d 
1033 (1974). The law of strict product liability is based on 
certain public policy considerations that have no relevance to 
this case. A survey of cases addressing the issue overwhelmingly 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (original design problem 
of entire system); Allen v. Heil Co., 285 Or. 109, 589 P.2d 1120 
(1979) (original design problem of entire system); Barker v. Lull 
Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
(1978) (original design problem of entire system); Union Supply 
Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) (original design 
problem of entire system); Brannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital 
Corp., 69 111. App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978) (product itself 
caused injury); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576 
P.2d 711 (1978) (original design problem of entire system); 
Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or. 647, 572 
P.2d 620 (1977) (original design problem of entire system); 
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(part itself caused injury); Lugue v. McLain, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 
P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (original design problem of 
entire system); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 
281 (1972) (original design problem of entire system); Worrell v. 
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (product itself caused 
injury); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 
P.2d 924 (1971) (identical to Gimbel's); Pike v. Frank G. Hough 
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) 
(original design problem of entire system); Larsen v. General 
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (original design 
problem of entire system); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 
111. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966) (part itself caused 
injury). 
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shows that the under J y i n j i jl i
 ( I 'inci m i 'in i ! . I M H I I <ip|jl f 
to d s i l.uation where one performs a customized service contract."7 
7
 I'm addition iu the cases cited in text, the following 
cases hold that a provider of services, such as Tel Tech, is not 
subject to a claim of strict liability. See Kaplan v. C Lazy U 
Ranch, 615 F supp. 234 (D Colo 1985} (where plaintiff fell 
from horse she had leased, she had no problem identifying 
defendants as ones responsible for alleged act of negligence and 
strict liability claim was barred); Barry v. Stevens Equip, Co., 
176 Ga. App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985) (where employer had asked 
defendant to completely rebuild machine but had not asked for 
safety devices, contract was for services and defendant was not 
subject to claim of strict liability); Industrial Risk Insurers 
v. Creole Production Services, 746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(service of pipeline consulting not subject to strict product 
liability theory); Kodiak Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. Delaval 
Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984) (repairer and rebunaer 
of generator not subject to claim of strict products liability); 
Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) 
(designer and constructor of building not subject to doctrines of 
implied warranty and strict liability where primary objectives of 
the transaction are to obtain services); siciliano v. Capital 
City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984) (amusement 
park owner/operator held to standard of reasonable care and is 
not subject to strict liability); Winans v. Rockwell Intern. 
Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) (a repairer of engine on fi-
that exploded in midair could not be held strictly liable for 
engine defects existing after it overhauled the engines; repairer 
provides services which are not covered under strict liability); 
Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(inspector of industrial plant could be held liable for 
negligence, but not for strict liability); Stafford v. 
International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1981) (if 
transaction is predominantly service oriented with incidental 
transfer of parts and components, strict liability doctrine does 
not attach); Hall v. State, 106 Misc. 2d 860, 435 N.Y.S.2d 663 
(1981) (provider of professional services not subject to suit ::)i:i 
grounds of strict products liability; design and problems 
therewith are not a "product" but provision of professional 
services); Stuckey v. Young Expl. Co., 586 P.2d 726 (Okl. 1978) 
(a repairer is held to a negligence standard and does not fall 
within the theory of strict liability); Walla v. United States, 
432 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (United States government's 
planning and designing cow yard are services which are beyond the 
scope of strict liability doctrine); Costaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des 
Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977) (designer and 
In addition to the fact that a contract for services does not 
fall within the express coverage of Section 402A, as adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., v. Armco Steel 
Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) or the Court's justification for 
its adoption, the reasons are myriad for the overwhelming refusal 
to extend Section 402A's parameters to service contracts. 
First, a supplier or manufacturer of a defective product is 
in a qualitatively different position than someone such as Tel 
Tech that provides a specialized, custom service, because of its 
ability in mass production to develop standardized processes and 
quality control. (Mr. Conger himself recognized this and other 
policy issues which distinguish the service contract situation 
construction supervisor of chemical facility cannot be held 
liable in absence of negligence); Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider 
Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977) (ski area operator is 
not manufacturer or seller of tramway but only provides a 
service, i.e., transportation up the mountain slope); Raritan 
Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 
197 2) (strict liability did not extend to a servicer of landing 
gear on airplane which crashed); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 
Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969) (claim of strict liability by 
hotel patron who slipped on bath mat was properly dismissed); 
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist who 
designed contact lenses for plaintiff's particular physical 
requirements and needs, developed contact lenses after the 
physical exam specifically for plaintiff, and whose specific 
lenses were not offered to the general public in regular channels 
of trade, was not subject to claim of strict liability); Pepsi 
Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service Co., 427 P.2d 833 
(Alaska 1967) (defendant who failed properly to repair boiler not 
subject to claim of strict liability); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) (dentist who broke needle 
inside patient while injecting local anesthetic not subject to 
strict liability). 
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from one where Section 402A -.?• properly applir 1, See Footnote 2, 
III' i 'I i n 1 1 1 j j, i II I,' 11 mi in i * I 1 1 1 Pi 1 1 1 1 1 II I II in in in c II mi i n i n i . | I 11 e x t e n d 
I lllh ii t h e o r y o i s L i i i l l i a b i J i l y Lu an i n d e p e n d e n t c o i i t r a c t o i who 
, , u i d e d c u t t .unized s e i v i c e s , t h e c o u r t i n Y a r b r o v . H i l t o n 
H o t e l s Coi p I'"I I I  ' I I 11 ' I Il I"iH li I 1 i Il I s t A I nil 
"Suppliers and manufacturers, who typically supply and 
produce components in large quantities, make standard goods 
and develop standard processes. They can thus maintain high 
quality control standards in the controlled environment of 
the factor[y]. On the other hand, the architect or 
contractor can pre-test and standardize construction designs 
and plans only in a limited fashion In addition, the 
inspection, supervision and observation of construction by 
architects and contractors involves individual expertise not 
susceptible to the quality contro] standards of the 
factor],; " 
Id. at 828 (q noting Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of 
Hi III, C h a r l e s P a r i s h , 3«i h S o 2 ci "II, 1 8 1 , 1 J R li (ill a ! 97 8 ) | , see al&<: > 
L e m l e y v . J & B T i r e C o . , 4 2 6 III'11 t ' i u p p II! M , I  III'mi1 (V i il P a ll'ii ) 
("While the burden of proof to isli ,»w negligence II' \ HI manufacturer 
in i II! i f f i c i i II ill in in where produ I i1 in : i M ruul^nl i zed a in rill mass 
produced, the burden ol; showing negligence against a repairman, 
II Ii in list repair one car at a time, is easier It was the social 
p i l l I i V I I ' l n l H i I K i l l ml I hi NIIMMH- I iiil'lia;! IIIKl! M i l Ill i II.!" 1. pi 'UCllI Il 
di s tr ibutor that induced the adoption ,»!! il lie ib t r i c t l i a b i l i t y 
d o c t r i n e , See Comment F to Sec 40*;*A Il In i t p o l i c y us not 
< i i ) l p l I I ' d l l i i i II I 1 II Il III | l l l-M I III II II ml Il III Ill III f i . Il I ' l l I l l ,1 Il l Ill I l l III III 1 I I I li III III mi II, II 
repair and an isolated sale")-
Indeed, 
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n[t]he services of experts are sought because of their 
special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary 
skill and competence of members of their profession, and a 
failure to discharge that duty will subject them to 
liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are 
not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect 
only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service, 
not insurance." 
Allied Properties v. John A. Bloom and Associates, Engineers, 25 
Cal* App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972) (engineering 
services not covered by doctrine of strict liability) (quoting 
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954)). 
A similar and related policy consideration for adoption of 
strict product liability was the consumer's difficulty to trace, 
pinpoint and prove fault up the distribution chain to a distant 
mass producer of goods. In dismissing plaintiff's claim of 
strict products liability in a contract for services, the court 
in Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d 
976 (1981), stated: 
Further, the policy considerations responsible for the 
evolution of the doctrine of strict tort liability have no 
relevance to the facts of this case. As originally proposed 
strict products liability was to provide a means of recovery 
of damages for product-caused accidents against retailers 
and wholesalers in situations where the manufacturer was not 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
manufacturer's pockets were not deep enough. (See e.g., 
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 
1114-24.) This consumer oriented policy also evolved to 
provide a means for injured parties to recover damages 
against manufacturers of defective products who were 
otherwise insulated from direct contact with the consumer or 
user by the wholesalers and retailers involved in the modern 
mass marketing chain. . . . 
Unlike the mass production of products for distribution to 
the consuming public, there exists no mass production of 
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services which defendants1 7-Eleven store provides. These 
services are custom-tailored to meet the needs of the 
particular customers in the neighborhood. Consequently, 
there exists no body of distant consumers who are confronted 
with the difficult burden of tracing incompetent workmanship 
by the service provider. The transaction in this case 
emanated from the face to face relationship. Once plaintiff 
was injured as a result of faulty service, an action for 
negligence provides him with both an effective and 
reasonable remedy. 
4J8 i il I { t. i J ill "in Mil I emphasis suppl ied) , see a l s o La Rasa v. 
S c i e n t i f i c Design Co. , 40/ F.?d 937, 94,? ( lid l9h.HH 
( "Prof ess i c111<in I 11ervi ref iIII11 1111I  111 rtinan I y I vin 1 I heiiise I ves t 11 t II11 
doc t r i ne oi tuj I l i a b i l i t y withoul I mil. but atist I IIn Il u \\ I lit 
elements which gave I IHH to the d o c t r i n e Theie is im nias^ 
p r o d u r 1 i < in Il  i |i i Il i m II ii i i)i II i II ^ 11 II m II 1i II i i n I i i J I I >; U I I I M I ' win mi i II 
would be u n f a u Lu i equine to i i a c e the1 d i t i c l e they used along 
the channels of- t r a d e lu thf m iqinal manufacturer ami t h e r e t o 
p m p o i n l ill linn II 11 II mi in ii" y 1 i g e m i i t inn I i I i i mi II l i t i i llluiiniiw II i I g i inn Il 
even from then: ability to inquire . Thus , pr Il i M--. lonai services 
form a marked contrast to consumer products cases and even in 
t 1 1 , U fa e I III I 1, S Ull 1 II I I I II II J" i. I i Il II II Il II II I ' ' II I I II III« Il Il II II II II:« Il I!!:.. 11, I I, („'" Ii, 1 1 1 
liability a majority of decisions have declined to apply i 
profess ional services " |i Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, inc. „, 
S Idaho h""IP ,1,1'J I"",.,""d ill I, 5 8 8 (197r»|i ("Tho r a t i o n a l e lias 
been thoroughly explored it is sufficient to \ \ 
t h a t as c o n t r a s t e d \ ii i I Ii I Ii n- i\ ; loi if products personal 
s e r v i c e s do not in veil * e mass p roduc t ion with I Ii n l i t l i c u l t y , 
if not inability, of the obtention of proof oi neqjlgence. 
T h e in II inn i11 in I I II II in I M P I I i m i II in i i 11 i i \ i n II m II ill •• mi \ 1 1 y 
comes into direct contact with the one offering service and is 
aware or can determine what work was performed and who performed 
itff); K-Mart Corp, v, Midcon Realty Group of Conn., 489 F. Supp. 
813, 819 (D. Conn. 1980) ("Indeed, the ability of K-Mart to 
isolate the architect as a possible source of negligence 
distinguishes this case from the typical strict tort liability 
cases involving defective products. An injured consumer's need 
to overcome the practical obstacles to identifying the possible 
wrongdoers in a mass production, mass distribution context is a 
rationale advanced in support of the strict liability 
doctrine. . . . In this context, it would be inappropriate to 
extend the doctrine of strict tort liability and dispense with 
the requirement that K-Mart plead and ultimately prove [the 
architectf s] negligence"). 
Risk distribution was also a primary consideration in the 
development of strict liability doctrine. See Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 
P.2d 436 (1944). Many courts have explained the inapplicability 
of risk distribution in a service contract setting. For example, 
in Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d 
976 (1981), the court stated: 
[R]etailers or manufacturers are able to proportion their 
losses among the consuming public simply by increasing the 
cost of their products which is viewed as a minimal cost 
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when, compared tc J-1" n " s suffered by the injured customer 
Moreover, risk distribution, which constitutes the 
fundamental underpinning for imposing strict tort liabix 
on sellers in the distributive chain is an inappropriate 
policy consideration in a service oriented business, ^ 
service provider ultimately must absorb the financial 
liability or endeavor to spread the loss among a limited 
number of customers. This limited capability of risk 
distribution would jeopardize the continued vitality of 
service providers, like defendants 
* - " " S,2d a I ji/ii! See also Stuart v. Crestview Mutual water 
Co. » 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, lid i""all Kptr 54 \ , 1 (197'i) ( "WF 
I 111 Il , I in i w i,j \ »»mi Il mi mi i Il i mi in Il in I!1' i mi J i 11 mi I in 11 ("I i in mi 1 I in ii'' ir:"" i in q i in e iF" ,1" s i, 11 in 11 
s t r i c t 1i ab i11 ty t heo r \ They rende r ed a p r o f e ss ion a 1 s e r v i ce 
and are in, no sense analogous to manufacturers who placed 
p i n i H i m n I • in II Hi iiiiiiiiiijii, km-1" t .d i i i I I I I "i 'iii11!1! 11 ,"" Il In mi d i n i- I III I  In II in i t 
position to spread tine cost of injuries result uuj f i om defective 
products"); Allied Properties v. John A. Bloom & Associates, 
Engineers , , L "'al App 3d 848, I ,i;» i" i I V\\\ \ s«'i | I M ',» | | i- i h 
r e s p e c t to l i a b i l i t y of a p rov ide r o£ s e r v i c e s , ' the well s e t t l e d 
r u l e in C a l i f o r n i a \t\ IT nil where the pi unai y n b i e c t i v e ot a 
t r a n s a c t i o n ii1,. Il, ,il 1  J i m b e i «"  ,i i- h , I, In.1 i l m I  II i n n nil I I I I [ I L i * M I  
war ran ty and s t r i c t ; l i a b i l i t y do not apply lie was not a 
s e l l e i of p r o p e r t y who o b l i g a t e d himself as p a r t of h i s bai cja, i ini 
t o convey pr ope i ty In f lie •• mi l l i on J epre sent eel, , , , I hiu: I . * 
genera l r u l e i s a p p l i c a b l e and those who s e l l t h e i r s e r v i c e s for 
1 II i i""" r II II ii i c i a n r e I I llr i i JI i is. 111 I I i i in "* o n i" m "i i • Ill' i n a n c 1 a 1 •) 11 rill p e r s o n a 1 
a t t a u s are iiut, l i a b l e JII the absence ot neg l igence or 
intentional misconduct111) (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 
481, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954)). 
Two basic conclusions emerge from the above case analysis. 
First, Tel Tech is in the position of a provider of customized 
services. Second, under the facts of this case, Tel Tech is not 
subject to the doctrine of strict products liability. Because of 
its skill and expertise in heliarc welding, Tel Tech was hired to 
perform a customized service—weld two spray balls into the top 
of an existing trailer. Plaintiff has successfully argued to 
this Court that in such a contract for services, the installer 
has a duty of ordinary care. However, Tel Tech was not in a 
position analogous to a distant, mass producer or distributor 
that is subject to standardized quality control procedures in a 
controlled environment. Rather, Tel Tech's customized service 
involved individual expertise and design engineering not subject 
to factory controls. 
Because plaintiff's claim is with the manner of installation 
rather than the spray balls themselves, the defective product 
problem of pinpointing, tracing and proving a remote act of 
negligence does not exist. Plaintiff's problem of proof of fault 
does not extend up the distribution chain, where the sale of 
defective, injury-causing spray balls would. In this personal 
service context, Mr. Conger himself came into direct contact with 
Tel Tech. He was intimately aware of what work was performed and 
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who pini"tnrntf-Mi i mi WIHMIIP inriini i l l wa.". .iiilegedly in ju red due t o 
f au l ty s e r v i c e , an ac t ion tor neg l igence provided hi in wilh I h 
an e f f e c t i v e and reasonab le remedy. 
Tei Tec n Wits HI mi mi in in i mi in i in mi 1 1 1 1 mi I -i in in in i in mi in mi in mm f art Hirers 
who p lace p roduc t s or. i" l.e market, whn a i e in 'he Lies t p o s i t i o n t o 
spread the cost nf irnuriefi r e s u l t i n g from d e f e c t i v e p r o d u c t s , 
and who p ropor t ion m e n h»ibbt-M» aiiinmm m in i.uiiuuuinii^ i 1111 11 ii| 
increasing costs of injurious products *li»l I'ech's welding 
MHivne i, jiJiiii11. til 1111- ill ii'ieneralJ'v l imi t ed tn the d a i r y i n d u s t r y 
and those in IIHH<I in I, s t a i n l e s s s t e e j win I 11,11 iiiij 11111 • • j in 111 ^ i liidi IIHU 
for labor and p a r t s , "• . p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n , spreading M, ' 
I HI in11, i!i it d i i i o n y , . i ii n . In II in mi in mi in I Il II mi ^ i II iiiir-'i'n w o u l d i p n p a r d i z e t h e v i t a l i t y 
ot Tel Tech or other simiiaily situated service providei b HIMI, 
because Mr. Congei * contention goes to * -i •. *•: 
1 I 1 S L d . l Let I. Li,> II l u l l 111 I l l 1 111 J i P I" T V h i I 1  r u nut xOOk, 
to the marketing chain for iisk distribution. 
ii- I NT II 
T H E T R I A L C 0 U R T i S J U R Y ADMONITION TO DiSREGARD ONLY 
TESTIMONY GOING SOLELY TO THE STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM 
CORRECTLY INFORMED THE JURY OF THE DIFFERENCE IN LEGAL 
CONCEPTS TN AVOIDING CONFUSION AND PREJUDICE 
Mr Conger contends that the trial court's admonition to the 
jury t :: :il isrecrard testimony that focused on I IIH strict liability 
t h e o r y c r e a t e u i n o n f u s i o n m1 n in iiiiiii i1. ui J Hie i t.n m m i mi i m 1111 n in MI m m >» 
p re jud iced Mi (longer1 h oegl lgence claim I" I ii i n t i f £' s cont not ion 
nu!i i 
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First, trial judges frequently grant motions for directed 
verdict as to some, but not all, claims, and commonly instruct 
juries on the consequences of the elimination of a claim and the 
need to disregard certain evidence going solely to that claim. 
Second, the claimed interrelatedness between Mr. Conger's 
claim of negligence and his claim of strict liability is a ruse. 
Plaintiff's expert testified extensively regarding the standard 
of reasonable care in the industry and Tel Tech's fault in 
respect thereto. Then, the focus of the testimony changed and, 
over objection, Mr. Eilers testified regarding the unreasonably 
dangerous condition of the "product" itself. As is shown by the 
distinction in Mr. Eilers' testimony, the case law draws the same 
obvious distinction between negligence (fault—look to the 
conduct of the alleged wrongdoer) and strict liability (no-fault 
—look to the condition of a product). See e.g., Brown v. 
Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 
470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988); Smith v. Home Light and Power 
Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987); Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 
102 Wash. 2d 68, 684 P.2d 692 (1984). The difference between the 
two theories is the focus of the trier of fact. The trial 
court's admonition correctly informed the jury of the differences 
in the legal theories, that they would be asked to determine the 
case on the fault theory only, and that the evidence going solely 
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Biswell v. Duncan, 74 2 P, i d Hii (Utah ftpp, H H » | „ Bigler v. 
Mapleton irr. Canal Ci , f» ft '* F ,> d 4 i 4 | "i I I I. I, <? H t) ; Debry_& Hilton 
Travel Services, Inc. v. Capi bod Inter n. Air way s , Inc , ,  5 8 3 I " 2! :l 
1181 (Utah 1978); Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2:7 
Utah 2d :i 88 493 If 2d ] 283 (111 IE ; 2 ) 1 1: j' iry admoniti on, 
fairly and accurately apprised the jury of the issues of fact ar .d 
h i 
Finaj i ' ouyei't* attorney argued the case to the jury 
relying heavily mi I.lie negligence "jury instructions ,« ml 
def i* HI Il in in in Mi I  in I  I mi " I t-\Ff i a r d i n g s t a n r i a r H s iin 
the industry, minimum standards oi i ^, . .Ili'ib n e g e d 
fault. 
Ill 11 II Il III In i l k i n mi II mi- 1 1 mi i ( I K mi u i in i i i i in I I i n i l l I i i i I i n i m i l J II mi i i i i i 
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correct ruling on Mr. Conger's strict liability claim. The trial 
court's explanation to the jury was fair and accurate and did not 
prejudice Mr. Conger's negligence claim. If Mr. Conger felt that 
the instruction was inadequate or confusing in any way, he 
certainly could have offered what he felt to be an appropriate 
alternative.® 
POINT III 
IF THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR ANOTHER TRIAL ON 
NEGLIGENCE, TEL TECH IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT MR. CONGER'S 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
8
 Even if the trial court's word choice, timing, or some 
similar aspect of the instruction were subject to question, such 
problems do not justify upsetting the jury's verdict. As the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
This Court has long held that "'[a litigant] is entitled to 
a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect 
trials." Trials are costly, not only for the parties, but 
also for the jurors performing their civic duty and for 
society which pays the judges and support personnel who 
manage the trials. It seems doubtful that our judicial 
system would have the resources to provide litigants with 
perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast 
of its constantly increasing case-load. Even this straight-
forward products liability suit extended over a three-week 
period. 
We have also come a long way from the time when all trial 
error was presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were 
considered "'citadels of technology.'" The harmless-error 
rules adopted by this Court and Congress embody the 
principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference 
to the automatic reversal for "error" and ignore errors that 
do not affect the essential fairness of the trial. 
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 
(1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 
(1973) and Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)). 
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Mr conger contends that j f the case j s remanded for another 
trial mi iiuql igerice, Tel Tech may not assert as an affirmative 
C l i f f~ I J ki i i K 11 i | t " 11 1 1 1 1 I 11 i ' i i 1 1 i i \| i" i \ i " mi 
argument for a new tiial, howevei in monger claims jury 
confusion and misunderstanding as a result of Hie mint 'H 
a i l l l l l i Hi) I II II i ill) II i i ill 11 M l iPlJ 11 II ill I iPil II 11 1 111 Il i l l llli 1 ) i 111 II I i 111 I t i l l II \ |ii Il II i I II 
Mr fillers i >timony l'el Tech d e n i e s any |ur ' r o n h i M u n i i 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d in i HI i i p r e j u d i c e t o Mi , r o n g e t ' s n e g l i g e n c e c l - u m . 
Hnwi'vei mi I 1 III i Mill I I 11 in in I I iiui'Y r o n t u u i o n o r misuinli i s t a n d i n g 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s e e how H u h c o n f u s i o n m mi i iiiiii I i i s t a n d i n g 
c o u l d 111 f a i l 1 y \ l i a r . 1 r t e i * i 7 n 1 1 m" <11111111 I i 111 , 1111 < > HI »111• i I 11 II II IIIi \ 
case , Hide i ill dur ing c ross -examina t ion Mr. E i i e i s t e s t l i i e u 
e x t e n s i v e l y r ega rd ing e r r o r s and omissions uf Mi iiiiiiii i 
e 7 i d p i i i ' c w l l l i i i III i l l in P I I \\ ii i i I I N i in i l l ' i l l i " I n IIIIII Inn IIIIII l • in II II in in in i n I mi M I I IM f e n i M c 
SurH) if the 'juiy wei e <J mi I u i > 11 dljniiil i h#-> extent to which it 
should r e l y on Hr F i l e r s 1 tes t imony, d e f e n d a n t ' s case would liave 
b e e n e q u i i i i i il i || 11 i1 | n i l il i ('ill I in n in ' i | m i, 
claim occur red . 
In a d d i t i o n , the jury wris i n s t r u c t e d to address Mr Conger 's 
c i i m p a r n I I MP I ,. mi I II „ n Il Ik-' |- e n c J i i n I !• i II, I 11 iiiiici II i t; iJm- I e i i - f ae m II v i I i I 
found Tel Tecli negligent: and such negligence the proximate cause 
The 'jury found that Tel Tech was not negligent in A therefore, it 
was i: ey t i i i ed nuI I riddi: esis l'"e I Il"" Ii MI af f i r m a i i ve de I IIIKP 
Therefore, the jury's finding on Mr. Conger's fault was in 
disregard of the instructions, went beyond their charge, and is 
unreliable. 
CONCLUSION 
The extensive factual and legal history of this case shows 
that Mr. Conger has had his day in court with fair, accurate and 
appropriate dispensation of justice and of legal standards. For 
this reason, Tel Tech respectfully requests this Court's Order 
affirming the Entry of Judgment on the jury verdict. 
DATED this / ~~ day of September, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Raymond M. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Tel Tech,''Inc. 
a5\rav\12804.002\rspbHef.pld 
42 
CERTIFICATE Ut SERVICE 
Th1r i s to c er t i fy that on the / ^ day of September, ] 989, 
II in 1 i iiiir rtiid corrert copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
« i > 1 it mi l l i in ¥\ i
 ( 1 1 \ ; ! 1 i i i : • in i j i ' i y i : 
Colin P King 
Giauque, Williams, Wixi . r 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
t^Q '•' .^ 
35 ,i a 12804 002 er tnia'i I 
